Plato
was concerned that there be an objective truth to values,
that the
absolute Good could be known with objective certainty to
distinguish
what is right from what is wrong. While the Sophists,
the
relativists, spoke of values in a conventional way, a way made
up
by the social body agreement. But for Plato, the Good was
an
objective knowing, and not merely what is believed and
accepted.
The Truth is a greater idea (or ideal) than truth as
merely socially
accepted belief. There appeared to be a
presumption in that school
that absolute standards for truth and
goodness could be comprehended
or defined.
Yet, a different
interpretation of the absolutist doctrine could
be that Truth and
Goodness are ideals to approach, that is, ideals
of knowledge.
These primary concepts were thought to be forms of
questions and
knowing, forms forming the essential structure of the
human
psyche, much like the gods and goddesses. and these higher
forms
of knowing were pre-inherent in the soul or psyche, and so
attainable
by the philosopher, the lover of wisdom. So, in the final
analysis,
such forms of wisdom were intuitively realized, through
re-collecting
the psyche.
For Plato, truth and knowledge exists before minds
discover it.
And this true knowledge can be comprehended directly,
because we are
in and of the truth. Truth is the ideal to which
the mind strives,
and this truth is essentially of the mind and
not necessarily found
in the world, though truth is potentially in
the world. So the mind
can comprehend the truth because the mind
is essentially formed of
the truth. Truth is the ideal form of
mind, the ideal knowing.
There may be some question in Plato
whether he placed more emphasis
on intuition or reason. I think he
found reason to be a guide to
truth, since truth must be
reasonable, and reason can find the
faults of misconceptions, but
the truth must finally be known
directly.
If reasoning could
not derive the absolute Good, then all that
we are left with, it
would seem, would be our instinct for knowing
the Good, and this
`instinct' could either be a direct intuition or
mere cultural
conditioning. Plato thought that man could directly
intuit, or
recollect, the Truth and the Good, and what propelled
man to such
heights of wisdom was the spirited desire for knowing
the Truth,
in this case moral truth. So the necessary virtue for
acquiring
moral knowledge is, first of all, the desire for such
wisdom,
presupposing, of course, the existence of such objective
truth.
In
order to act ethically, or make ethical decisions, and in
order to
be a moral being, moral knowledge is necessary. Right
knowledge
makes right character and right action. Right knowledge is
the
necessary precondition. Since this knowledge is already perfect
and
formed within the human psyche, and since this knowledge
is
essentially tied to the development of good moral character,
the
person is potentially and essentially a good moral character.
The
development, or actualization, of this good character will
require
self-contemplation, `recollection', or `remembrance',
following the
prescription of `know thyself'. Goodness is deep in
the heart of
each person, according to Plato, and all we need is
to desire it and
come to know or `recollect' it. The good man has
knowledge of the
Good, or knowledge of his true nature. Therefore,
Plato's ethics is
essentially a virtue ethic, whereby good moral
decision proceeds
from the character possessing the ability, or
`virtue', to know what
is right, which is a direct knowing, a
special form of knowing, a
moral kind of knowledge.
Yet, how do
we know the difference between true intuition of the
good and
false opinion of the good? Somehow, the objective knowing
of the
good through direct insight needs to distinguish itself from
mere
cultural conditioning. Only the wise can know what is true
knowledge,
and yet one needs true knowledge in order to be wise.
An
epistemological problem arises because one could not recognize
what
is true knowledge unless one already knew it; but then, one
would
have needed to know that he already knew it.
Also, the
acquisition, or recollection, of knowledge requires
the desire for
it. That desire is a moral virtue. But to have this
desire
presupposes that I have the insight that true knowledge is
inherent
(or available to comprehend), and that insight is a
knowledge in
itself. This problem is partially solved by the theory
that each
person is born with some degree of inherent desire for
true
knowledge, which propels them in their life-time to the
comprehension
of that universal knowledge.
Being good depends on knowledge of
the good; yet, knowledge of
the good depends on a good-will to
know the good. A good-will is
necessary to find knowledge of the
good which is necessary to be
good. This is not completely
circular, though, since the desire for
knowing and being good is
the first step, even though this desire
presupposes being good, to
some extent. Yet, this does not
presuppose the ability to DO good,
but only the virtue of
good-desire or good-will or the intention
to know and be good. Being
`morally good' is a general notion
having different stages of
virtue. First is having good desire or
intent. The second is the
virtue of being able to know and
distinguish the good which is
required for good moral decisions.
And the third stage is the
ability to act good, which requires the
second stage that requires
the first.
Is there some property or
properties which are essential to all
good knowledge or good acts?
When asked what is good one can give
various examples of what is
good, but these each carry with them
their own unique contexts.
Yet, if we cannot recognize what is
essentially common to these
various examples, then how are we to
recognize them as good? How
do these examples fall into the
categorical (or logical) form of
`good'? This was Plato's query.
There are basically three possible
answers to this question. Either
we recognize in these examples
the essential or a sufficient
property of the good, or we just
directly intuit them to be good,
or we just assume them to be good
because of our cultural moral
education or because we believe some
authority.
Now, how can we know an essential property of the
good? If we
discover this in `good people', or discover good from
the good in
the world, then we might ask how we assumed those
people or facts to
be `good'. We cannot ground knowledge of the
good in discovered
facts about the world or people, because the
good is an ideal to
approach and cannot be limited to facts. Facts
are meant to
approach the ideal, from the moral view, so facts
cannot define the
ideal. How, then, is this ideal derived or
discovered? Either
intuitively or by reason. One could claim that
the recognition of
goodness is immediate and intuitive by the
moral man, that the "good
man" is the man possessing
such intuitive powers for recognizing the
good. Another view could
be that some essential conditions of the
good can be determined in
some logically set manner, and so give
justification to moral
claims.
Either way, knowledge of the good is thought to be
objective.
This objectivity does not necessarily mean that the
Good is some
substantial property in actual things or actions. The
property may
be relationally dependent on the agent's intent, or
on the action's
consequences, or on how the action harmonizes (or
coheres) with
other actions. Of course, there would be `something'
within or
about a particular thing or act that is of the Good, or
which is
recognized as "good".
Plato considered
goodness as a `form' of knowing or as the ideal
value of which
things and events participate in to some degree. The
form of
goodness is a form of knowing, or a form of recognition.
Plato's
forms are not material substances found in the world or in
events.
Things and events are known as being of the form of good.
So, the
good is not a material essence; it's an essential form of
objective
knowledge. Another interpretation in this vein is that the
form of
the good is form of being itself, that is, a form of being
man, a
form of virtue, an actualized ability to comprehend and
recognize
the good.
Value is not objective in the sense that it does not
depend upon
the mind. We cannot say that value exists
independently of the mind,
as we might say of trees, but this does
not mean value is `merely'
or `just' subjective. Value is a
valuation `made' by the mind or
agent, but this doesn't mean it is
just "made up" because there
could be a sense of it
being `found', or even `recollected'. Also,
value could depend on
the person but it doesn't have to follow that
value is merely
relative to each person. Even if different people
were to value
differently, there could still be objective
truth-value. People
could be value wrongly. The epistemological
problem is that we
would need to have some criteria for knowing who
is right and who
is wrong, or who holds (or has found) the true
value. But how
would we arrive at this criteria? How can the
criteria be
justified? We still need a criteria or definition of
`good'.
The naturalistic move is to claim that whatever most
healthy and
`normal' people consider as good is good,
assuming
there are at least some general agreements. This is the
empirical
appeal, which reduces the epistemological problem to
questions of
social science. Kant was one who fought against such
moves and
claimed that what `ought' to be, or what is ideal,
cannot be merely
derived from what `is'. We can't just claim that
the good is
realized by looking at good people, or at the majority
of people.
The majority could very well be wrong and we cannot
find "good
people" without first knowing the good that
justifies their claim at
being good. Plato believed we cannot
merely look about in the world
for our ideals, since the world
presents us with mere attempts at
ideals, or with incomplete
actualizations of this ideal-potential.
Other philosophers tried
to logically arrive at the necessary
conditions for knowing or
intuiting or feeling what is truly good.
These are conditions of
attitude, such as "disinterestedness" and
"sympathy"
(or engrossment), which are two main notions that I will
call
"impartial concern". Maybe there is no way to find the
essence
of the good, or maybe the essence cannot be stated but
only
recognized. Maybe all this depends on already having the
capacity to
know the good, like a moral sense. So maybe the best
we can do is
to define the necessary subjective conditions for it
being known,
instead of the necessary objective conditions for
something being
good.
Impartial concern could be a necessary
subjective condition for
realizing what is good, but there appears
to be, given empirical
fact, no guarantee that such preconditions
necessarily lead to good
action, so such preconditions, or
attitudes, are not sufficient for
good action. Impartial concern
may be the essence of good intent,
but Kant claimed that good
moral intent required good moral
reasoning as well. Whether we
need some special moral reasoning, or
if special moral concern is
sufficient for the qualification of
`moral intent', is a modern
debate, and I'll consider the reasoning
of the debate in just a
bit.
ARISTOTLE'S TELEOLOGY
Aristotle logically
presupposed an ultimate ideal of "happiness"
or
"well-being" or "fulfillment". However we wish to
name this
ultimate Goal in life, it is not limited to what "feels
good", or
even to being healthy, or even to be very
knowledgeable. For
Aristotle, the ultimate Good is a final,
end-in-itself ideal, as the
logical purpose for man, the ideal
possible actualization of man's
potential, which requires
sufficient intention and effort. This is
a logical concept, so
Aristotle does not need to commit to any
particular condition or
occurrence as being the ultimate Goal. He
just says it is
logically necessary that there be an ideal state of
man's being,
not as a predetermined substance or eternal form, but
as the
ultimate potential of man, the ultimate of what man is
capable.
All good desires and good aims of man must be instrumental
to this
final aim, according to this logical relation. But not all
desires
and aims are equal in their instrumental value. Some
succeed
better than others, and the ultimate Ideal may require a bit
of
balancing and reconciling various instrumental activities.
A
problem then arises with such a logical Ideal that cannot
be
empirically pinned down. That is, any name or psychological
state
attributed to it could not be a sufficient condition for
the
definition. And since no one kind of action or condition is
ever
enough to ultimately `satisfy' or `fulfill' the whole man,
not even
the highest action which is contemplation; we are left
with the aim
to be all we can be, forever suspicious that there
might be more to
one's ultimate fulfillment. And there is also a
problem here with
judging the instrumental value of various
activities when the Aim to
which they ought to be instrumental is
insufficiently defined. How
can I know what activities are good if
I have yet to know the end to
which they are supposed to be good
for? So the question remains as
to how we can know what is
good.
In order to make any value judgements we first need to make
some
defined commitments as to what is necessary for my
`well-being', or
what constitutes `well-being', or what IS
`well-being'. Is it a
healthy body, an alert and witty mind, a
peaceful but courageous
temperament? Is it being wise, feeling
pleasure, being in caring
relations? It may be all of these and
more, but don't I need to
know what is necessary and if there is
some combination or
integration which can be said to be sufficient
for well-being? And
how will I know this well-being? Through a
feeling or a
contemplation or reasoning? Maybe all we can say is
that we have a
plurality of primary goals which are realized in
various ways, in
which some have something in common while others
appear to be
contradictory or in conflict.
Aristotle would say
that in spite of these arguments there must
logically be one
ultimate aim to which all these meaningful goals
lead. But this is
merely a logical relation between the final end
and all other ends
which must be means to that final end. It does
not give us any
empirical clues or references for judging what
exactly are good
ends, or how to know if one fulfilled the final
end. This final
end does not help us know what is good, for it is
merely claiming
that there must be some final good or an ideal end
to which good
action fulfills. I still need to decide somehow what
are the most
valuable aims in my life, and if I experience
incompatible desires
I need to figure how to reconcile or balance
them.
Aristotle
thinks we need to use reason to solve these problems.
Practical
reason is the rational ability to efficiently fulfill the
ultimate
aim. It is useful in organizing, ordering and calculating
the
instrumental means toward some end. Here, reason is used to
find
the best proportions and combinations of virtues/capacities for
the
final Aim. But as I have shown, this final aim has no
empirical
reference. It cannot be formally defined (or at least
decided
upon). Yet, we need to define one or some of the aims in
order for
us to know what we are calculating and proportioning
toward, and
reason cannot define this, except logically. Practical
reason can
only link causes, instrumental values and consequences.
It can only
find How-to and Why, but cannot tell us What-for. It
cannot tell us
the instrinsic value to which instrumental values
might lead. Reason
cannot tell me what is most important as an
end-in-itself.
Aristotle believes the rational desire must
dominate or organize
the other desires. In fact, this is the
function of the rational -
to organize the other functions or
virtues, noting that all virtues
are functional toward some
greater end. Desires are mechanical and
the only "reasoning"
in them is the practical knowledge of how to
actualize itself. So
`higher reason' is needed to reconcile,
balance and organize the
various "narrow-minded" desires, which
would otherwise
`think only for themselves'. The practical reason
helps find
pathways to ideal happiness, which is assumed to require
a balance
of the desires and natural dispositions. The ultimate (and
logical)
balance would be between indulgence and suppression of all
desires,
a kind of temperance where no one desire can completely
eliminate
or dominate the others. The well-being of man would be
the
well-balanced life. The good life would be actualization of
all
potentials, though without excess, to be un-attached to any
desire
but at the same time not indifferent, to somehow preserve
the
passion(s) while not letting them tyrannize the whole being,
to
maximize freedom of desires and virtues while minimizing the
harm
they might do to oneself and others.
Aristotle also
believed that good action, and a good moral
character, depended on
good or bad habits. This doesn't solve the
logical need to define
and ground the `good' in good habits, but it
is a psychological
recognition that goodness of character and action
does not just
depend on a sufficient moral knowledge. Knowledge,
especially
practical knowledge, is needed in actualizing good
decision and
action, and yet psychological or behavioral habits are
inertic
forces that must be reckoned with. Knowing what is good [to
do] is
not necessarily enough! Not enough for the knowledge to
transfer
to action. Habits may be in the way. Behavior may be more
inertic
than thought. Actual behavior is different from thinking
about it,
and it may require intermediate abilities or properties.
Habits of
the various desires (passions) must be reconciled
with, not only
within practical thought, but in doing as well. And
when action
gains consistency in being directed by reason, then this
becomes
good habit, since such repeated and developed behavior has
good
reason behind it, practical reason in that it is justified by
how
practical the behavior serves an intrinsic good or teleological
aim.
Good [moral] behavioral habits are developed by consistent
practice,
and they are noted from other habits by their practical
efficient
means to the goals we seek, primarily the goal of
happiness.
Whether such a hedonistic ideal is logically a moral
ideal as well
is a matter of moral debate. It would seem that the
aim to which
good moral practice serves, and which justifies the
qualification
of good, in this sense, ought to be essentially a
moral aim, one
which is defined not merely by one's [hedonistic]
happiness.
Yet,
such an apparent hedonism is tempered with an expanded view
of
self happiness, which necessarily involves others or a social
body.
Aristotle sees cooperation and social justice as positive
values
for self-happiness. Whereas Hobbes saw social cooperation in
a
negative way, where humans would need cooperation, social
contract
and obligation in order to protect themselves from the
self-hedonism
of others. For Hobbes, social obligation is a
necessary constraint
that all must agree with, so that man's
natural instincts for
pleasure and acquisition do not lead to
violence. One is not
considering the pleasures, happiness, or
justice of others, except
as a rational means to the overall
preservation of a society of
beasts.
But Aristotle sees justice
as grounded in man's sympathetic
nature and his need to cooperate
justly with those participating in
a similar social body. I think
he also could view justice, or
social good, as a practical
necessity to self happiness. This
practicality could then be
viewed either in Hobbes' negative manner
or in Aristotle's better,
more positive view of man. Both Hobbes and
Aristotle see
cooperation and justice in terms of individual
prosperity, as
instrumental to individual happiness; but for Hobbes
this is a
rational constraint on human instinct, while for Aristotle
these
are efficient means to enhancing the field-possibilities
for
self-happiness.
That `self' is not an isolated abstract
from some world-at-hand,
or from a social and physical
environmental context. The
individual`s life is a life lived
within and concerning some world
or environment. The individual
self either takes unreciprocaly from
that world or it gives
according to need, or it is nurtured from its
relation there in.
The classical ideal was a harmonious and
prosperous world of
harmonious and prosperous people. The world and
the people
re-making that world are intimately related. They are
intrinsically
related because person and world both need the other
in their
respective definition and understanding. Person is
person-in-world
(the question is `what world?') and world (or
environment) is the
context made of that collection of persons and
inter-relations.
The
individual is primary over society, and society is thought
to be
instrumental to the individual's well-being. Even though
instrinsic
value is individualistic, the value of the individual is
intimately
connected with the value of society and other people.
The
Aristotelian man is not merely hedonistic and
self-concerned,
because his actualization and completion is
dependent on other
people and the whole of the social environment.
Man is, by nature,
social and political, and our virtues are
fulfilled in society or in
interaction with others, so `happiness'
has to include others.
Yet, this claim of social dependence does
not necessarily
convince me that I ought to care for all others or
even care that
others fulfill anything other than what I need them
to do for my
happiness. My own self-happiness is still primary in
this ethic, so
the value of social concern and justice depends on
the benefit to
the primary concern which is me. Only that social
cooperation which
serves my happiness is given value. If a certain
act is expected to
serve the society but not myself, then does it
have ethical value?
Not if any value depends on its worth to the
primary goal of
self-happiness.
Is there, then, a logical
relation between my self-happiness and
the well-being of society?
The relation is not logical, because a
society could prosper at
the expense of myself, while I could
prosper at the expense of
others. But the ideal ethical relation
between self and society
would necessarily tie together. That is
the ideal, but not
necessarily the actual. In actuality, the
individual identity and
happiness is often tied to society's, and
vice versa, but not
always or necessarily. It may be true that I am
tied to some
social context, as the social reality I actualize
within, but I'm
not essentially tied to all the people within a
large social
context since many could die without eliminating some
`necessary'
social context. Even those people who are part of my
social
concern, my particular social world, might become mere
instruments
to my wishes and self-happiness. Aristotle does say,
though, that
we Need friendship which is an equal relation and not a
slave-master
relation, and that we expand our own happiness through
an empathy
for other's happiness. This sounds convincing but only
up to a
point, since I could indeed care deeply for a few friends
(and how
many can you practically have?) while neglecting everyone
else.
I
accept my own intrinsic worth and ultimately value my
own
fulfillment, but there are no binding reasons for me to value
others
equally as I value myself. To believe, as Aristotle, that
social
justice is intimately tied to my own well-being may be true
up to a
point, but this "necessary connection" does not
appear too strong,
since the community might flourish as a whole
while I still suffer,
and my self-sacrifice for the community
might not necessarily pay
off for me (except maybe karmicaly or in
heaven), and it is
certainly possible for me to personally
flourish, albeit with a few
friends, while depleting community
resources.
We could logically move from the intuition of my-self
intrinsic
worth to the intrinsic worth of all selves. Since my
self-happiness
is primary, so then is the happiness of others. And
then one might
weigh the worth of all selves, including my-self.
Thus, the ethical
decision would depend on a calculation of
self-happiness, though not
exclusively, nor primarily, my own.
From here, we could hypothesize
two philosophical routes. Either
we add together all the values of
self-happiness, including my
own, to determine an ethical value, or
we give special worth to
greater values of self-happiness, such that
higher, more worthy
experiences of happiness are primary over lesser
fulfillments. The
first route is egalitarian and based on equal
individual happiness
worth. The second route could be aristocratic,
because it is based
on a hierarchy of happiness value, so that an
elite group
actualizing their fulfillment, at higher or more complete
levels,
would have greater value than a larger majority group being
fulfilled
on lesser, more primitive levels.
HUME'S
SENSIBILITY
Hume argued that reason could not discover moral
value, and that
reason cannot persuade one of ultimate, intrinsic
values. Values
are founded on feeling, specifically moral
feelings, in answer to
the question of "How do we know what
is good?" Reasoning has no
foundation for deriving intrinsic
value or the ethical base value.
Reasoning is only essentially
instrumental in making hypothetical
causal connections or
teleological connections, and reasoning can
determine the
coherency of logical or analytical connections. For
Hume, what is
essential to moral decision, and what defines it, is
not a moral
reasoning but a moral sensibility. But what is this
sensibility?
It doesn't tell us what is morally `good' or `right',
in the sense
of an objective property or objective truth, for it is
the
resulting response of a kind of sympathetic sensitivity. So,
moral
`good' is re-defined from being a property, proposition, or
law,
to being an ability or response of a natural
[moral]
sensitivity.
Hume's `moral sense', a dispositional
concept already vaguely
used by previous moral philosophers, is
more than just a good-will
or a desire to be good. It is a faculty
of moral judgement, a
natural sense for knowing what is right and
good. Though for Hume,
this is not an intuitive faculty for
comprehending the notions of
objective good, nor for recognizing
what can legitimately fit in
such a category of `the good',
because the moral sense is a
non-rational sympathetic nature. So,
this moral sense is not
identical to Plato's intuition of
objective, true Good. It is
not a recognition of the Idea or Ideal
of Good, nor is it a
recognition of the essential objective
property of goodness. `The
good' is being re-defined here in a
distinctly empirical fashion, in
that the exercise of this
sympathetic nature is all that can be
expected of ethical
rightness. Rational justifications for ethical
truth are
ungrounded, so all we can morally do is to listen and
exercise
this sympathetic sense. In the final analysis, this
sympathetic
sense, and not reason, will define what is morally good.
Hume
believed that moral knowledge consisted just of a feeling
of
either attraction or repulsion, of pleasure or pain, of + or -,
and
this feeling is then comprehended as a `good' or `bad' moral
feeling.
And thus, the concept of `good' is essentially tied to the
positive
feeling of one's sympathetic nature. We have this feeling
that
something or an action is good or bad, which is essentially a
good
feeling about something. From this sympathetic sense, `X'
feels
good or not. And we naturally desire more of the good [moral]
feeling
rather than the bad (painful or repulsive) feelings, so this
moral
sense also motivates us to seek out that good feeling by good
ethical
action and supporting others doing likewise. Since moral
action
gives us this `moral pleasure' it follows that we would want
to
behave morally in order to feel more of this.
The next question
is, then, what kinds of action or consequences
promote those good
feelings when in the sympathetic attitude or from
sympathetic
sensing. And the answer to this question of `what kind'
would be
discovered by the empiricist through psychological studies,
and
not reason and not intuition. A problem with such a study,
though,
is to find people with healthy and well developed
moral
sensitivities, and the other problem is in distinguishing
`moral'
feelings/pleasures from other kinds. The philosophical
problems of
kinds and definitions/criterias do not disappear in
the empirical
approach.
What is this good feeling? How is this
distinguished from other
kinds of good feeling? Moral pleasure is
not the same as other
pleasures. One does not `need' to feel
tingly sensual all over in
order to identity what is good, and
such sensual pleasure is not
sufficient for the moral
qualification. This moral pleasure, this
feeling is of a distinct
type, that is, of the `moral' type. It is
a moral sense, a moral
feeling, a moral pleasure, as distinct from
other kinds of
pleasure. Yet, simple naming does not help us
identify the
distinction between moral and non-moral pleasures (or
good
feelings). Many kinds of emotion can be experienced as
pleasurable
or positive. And the qualification of the `moral'
distinction
requires justification.
One proposed solution is that we acquire a
better and better
`sense' of what is a moral feeling from what is
a hedonistic
feeling, or that we `learn' to know the difference.
But this either
adds another problematic `sense' to an already
questionable one, or
it is begging the question of how to know the
difference between
moral affinity and any other kind of affinity.
For to know the
difference, one would need to test the feeling
with some presupposed
standard of goodness. How could I know the
difference of senses, or
resulting feelings, if I did not already
know or assume what is
morally good or just selfish? A similar
problem arises with
following God's Will, or religious authority,
or one's own
`conscience' (which is moral sense); that is, one
can't for certain
know if this IS God's Will, or a true authority
of God, or true
conscience, without first having a standard of
judgement as to what
is good. The arguments become circular.
The
problem with a moral sense is that one is forced to have
faith in
it, since there is no way to verify the truth of it or know
if it
is being exercised. And even with faith in a moral sense, we
would
need to know the difference between a moral feeling and
other
feelings that could contradict the judgement of true moral
sense. A
major argument against such a simple faith in this `moral
sense' is
that many people just don't seem to have it or are
confused about
it, since there is so much moral disagreement in
our world. All my
friends think they are right. I think I'm right.
It is usually
someone else who is wrong. Unless this moral sense
is morally
relative, many people who think they posses or exercise
the moral
sense probably don't, unless those who have completely
different
views on morality do not posses it. If the moral sense
is not just
subjectively relative, then some folks must be wrong
or misguided,
since there exist many opposing and contradictory
senses of what is
morally good. Either a number of humans are
wrong, or morality is
merely relative. If people can morally judge
only according to
their supposedly moral feelings, those feelings
could be deceiving
or we might be confusing `moral' good with some
other feeling.
The most significant problem with the moral sense,
according to
its general theory, is that it can become either
perverted or
distorted, or defeated by more powerful passions or
dispositions
having different aims and consequences than that of
the moral sense.
Once this possibility is admitted, and I think
one has to admit it,
moral judgements via a feeling-faculty of
moral sense becomes
questionable since feelings can so easily be
mis-read or distorted
by hedonistically based self-deceptions
(i.e., trying to appear
moral or good in the eyes of the social
conscience), and we may have
to doubt that we could even know when
this occurs. So, is there any
way to check on this
possibility?
Many people have conflicting moral views. Does this
mean that
their `moral sense' is different? I mean it could be
working well
but just different for different people. This may be
the argument
for gay/lesbian ethics, that they are mentally
healthy and sexually
functioning well but their "well
functioning" is different, and I
suppose any deviant or
abnormal behavior could be justified in this
way, including my
own. I don't mean that gays are deviants; just
that a relativity
or plurality of normality is defeating to ethical
norms. Another
explanation for differing judgements is that
everyone has the same
moral sense, which would derive the same
results, given common
ideal circumstances, but some have decided (or
are conditioned) to
not use it or to ignore it. In other words the
faculty for moral
knowledge is alive and well, and objectively the
same for all of
us as well, but many suppress it or intentionally
violate it.
Even
if the moral sense were inherent in human beings there is
no
certainty that it would function properly, or rule over habits
of
judgement and action. In effect, one needs a certain amount
of
right moral sense to recognize the moral sense as distinct
from
other `senses', and to recognize moral thoughts from other
kinds of
thoughts, or to recognize the moral whatever from the
non-moral.
What distinguishes the moral sense from being merely
what one thinks
is moral? If there is something that gives this
distinction, then
these are reasons for believing what is moral
from what is not. And
these reasons are, then, ethical criteria
and propositions. If no
reasons are given for believing that a
decision comes out of the
moral sense (or caring sense), as
distinct from the immoral or
non-moral (apathetic) senses, then we
are left to surmise that this
belief in what is a moral feeling is
based on intuition, that is, a
moral-knowing intuition. Thus, an
intuition substantiating an
intuition.
And those who do not
acknowledge this inherent problem but
believe whole-heartedly in
the working-power of their moral sense,
may be those susceptible,
by their lack of suspicion, of
self-deception. Those who would
never doubt their `moral sense', or
question the rightness of
their judgements and action, are those we
might need fear the most
for their possible arrogance. And yet,
doubting the moral sense
may be cause for its dis-function or
defeat. Nonetheless, those
believing in the (their) moral sense
have no real foundation for
judging moral judgements except the
moral sense itself. And the
only means to question and confirm the
moral sense from other
senses would be a criteria for its right
functioning. This
criteria must be something other than the moral
intuition itself.
It must be a rational criteria or principle, or it
could be
`functional criteria', as in the proposition that the moral
sense
is at work whenever some other disposition is at work,
supposing
that some apparent quality, such as sympathy or care, has
a lawful
causal relation to the moral sense.
A different argument
is that the moral sense might not be
developed enough, or maybe it
got distorted due to poor conditioning
or education. If the moral
sense needs development, then we are left
with two major
questions: How do we develop it? How can we know if
it is
developed? If we need right `moral' education to develop it,
then
the educator or educative system must be rightly moral, and
capable
of rightly developing the moral sense. We then need to
determine
what is right (or best) education and development. How
are we to
do this, or who shall be given the authoritarian
privilege? Some
argue that it can only be developed by exercising
it. This feels
to be true, but knowing how to exercise it rightly
presupposes its
development. To exercise the moral sense (or
practice moral
sensing) is to judge in a morally right manner and
act in a moral
way, which presupposes the moral ability that is
needing more
development. To know when or if the moral sense is
sufficiently
developed is to presuppose that very moral sense, since
only the
moral sense itself could correctly judge if moral
judgements are
correct, as the test of sufficient development. So
all this is
grounded in circular reasoning.
We can, though, state the logical
necessary conditions for the
moral sense to work. These conditions
might also be the only test
of its proper functioning. One major
necessary condition would be
impartiality. Another would be
concern for others. For one would
need to not exhibit partiality
and self-interest in the moral
judgement, since such priority of
self-concern would be the mark of
primarily hedonistic and
egoistic thoughts, feelings and actions. A
priority of
self-concern or self-interest would contradict a moral
attitude,
since such self priorities are the `a priori' inclinations
of the
amoral man. The moral sense must presuppose some kind of
attitude
that is not merely a hedonistic concern. And having an
attitude of
impartiality might also insure that my good feelings are
moral
feelings and not just feeling good about self gains. Also, if
I'm
in an attitude of self-interest, then the moral sense is less
likely
to be heard or felt or exercised. I need to first posses a
concerned
sense for others, and not just my own preferences or my
own
desires and egoistic projects, in order for the moral sense
to
work.
Yet, this pre-conditional attitude of impartiality is,
itself,
an ethical supposition and a condition of ethical
reasoning. It
doesn't have any substantiating grounds, though Kant
derived it from
a logical necessity for universality in
philosophical claims, that
any true ethical claim must be true for
all people and all similar
circumstances. In other words, it would
be logically contradictory
to say that deceiving some people is
fine while deceiving others is
not, or that serving the needs of
some (or just myself) is good
while neglecting the needs of others
is not not-good. Kant's
substantiation for the empirical condition
of an impartial attitude
is grounded in its logical necessity and
its tie to the logical
meaning of morality itself. He is answering
the question of why
impartiality is essential to ethical
judgement. Likewise, `concern
for others', as a moral ought, would
need substantiation; unless it
is not a moral prescription at all,
but is instead a psychological
descriptive fact of `human nature'
or part of the essence of what it
is to be human. Humans, by
definition, or by study of this `kind of
being', either Are
sympathetic by nature and Are concerned for
others, or they Ought
to be by moral and reasoned prescription.
There may also
be a distinct feeling that necessarily goes with
impartial moral
judgements, which can act as a test, though not a
sufficient test.
This is a feeling of being impartial or what has
been called
"disinterest", meaning my interest here is not
essentially
for myself or for my self-ends. When I feel
"dis-interested"
(meaning impartial interest or diminished
self-interest vs. no
interest at all) I know that my self-appetite
is not steering my
decisions which is the necessary condition
(though maybe not
sufficient) for the moral sense to function. In
other words, by
definition of moral sense and moral action, the
egoic interests
and appetites need to be "dis-interested" or
"impartial".
There can be an interest in moral action, or in
moral
pleasure/feeling, but not in sensuous or egoic pleasure or
in
primarily serving my own ends (interests).
Yet, if one
acquires a pleasure or good feeling from moral
action, this is
still my pleasure and my interest, even if it is not
caused by
goods merely serving myself. The traditionally assumed
attitude of
dis-interest does not account for a simultaneous serving
of self
and others. It seems to forget the possibility of desiring
and
being self-interested in helping others and also denies
the
possibility of mutual interest between myself and another.
One
might feel very interested in doing a particular action,
like
caring for another or making love, and that interest may be
self
serving as well as other serving. All that I'm aware of know
here
is that I'm interested in doing X-action with Y-person, and the
full
motive for that interest may be complex and also hidden from
view.
There may be some self-pleasurable payoff in this action
which is
primarily intended for the good or happiness of the other
person,
and such would not discount the act from being moral. Just
because
an action is pleasurable to me, or even of interest to me,
does
not necessarily entail that it is just selfish or not helpful
or
not moral. If moral actions are those which help others and
which
do not prioritize my own self-interest or merely expedite my
own
goals, then it is possible that such actions help others and are
in
my self-interest too.
So it would seem that moral action is not so
much out of self
dis-interest but IS Necessarily out of an
interest for the other, as
an "end-in-herself" or as
possessing intrinsic worth, and not
`merely' using the other
instrumentally to reach one's own goals or
desires. I can still
desire her, and have interest in her pleasures,
and I can still
desire that she be instrumental to my pleasure, and
as long as I'm
not Merely using her but considerate of her needs and
intending to
fulfill them; then there is no reason to deny this as
moral action
since it possess the essence of moral intent.
Unfortunately,
though, Kant appeared to imply that any intent for
self happiness
was a disclaimer of moral decision. Our social life
is more
interdependent and interconnected than Kant's simplicity of
duty
vs. self-interest. If only he had made love, more or at all,
he
would have noted the obvious fact that loving is enjoyable for
the
other and oneself, such that duty and self happiness are
not
logically opposed.
Another essential subjective
condition for moral judgement,
rather than impartiality, could be
the attitude or feeling of
`sympathy', as that emotional quality
which identifies with
another's experience, with their needs and
feelings. Like
impartiality, this attitude of sympathy can be
posited as both a
necessary empirical precondition and a logical
presupposition of the
moral sense. It could also be considered a
necessary test of a
developed moral sense. Sympathy can be
understood as either an
empirical condition and an analytic
condition. The empirical
condition is the feeling or attitude of
sympathy. It is in reference
to a certain subjective state. And
this state is sometimes
volitional and sometimes imperative, as in
"I will be sympathetic"
or "Be sympathetic!"
The analytic condition of sympathy is its tie
to the definition of
morality itself, since `moral sense' and `moral
action' is, by one
kind of conditional definition, `a sympathetic
response to
others'.
Moral sense and action presupposes a sympathetic (or
`moral')
attention to others that does not just view them as
objects or
instruments for one's own pleasure. Though, again, we
may still
acquire pleasure from them. One could also view sympathy
as
motivating the moral sense and developing it. But if the
moral
sense is, essentially, a sympathetic sense, then this
last
`empirical' claim reduces to an analytical tautology. It does
seem,
though, that sympathy, like "disinterest" or
"impartiality",
actually brings us out of our
self-absorbtion and self-concern. In
fact, sympathy, or some
empirical emotion or attitude like it, seems
to be the primary
motivator and empirically necessary condition for
helping
others.
Sympathy, as a prime virtue, of which care and concern
for
others are sister concepts, seems to be the power behind
moral
action and capable of overcoming the powerful inclination
of
striving for one's own happiness and self-success. That
great
striving for one's own success and the fulfillment of one's
needs
and desires can become fanatically egoistic/hedonistic and
sometimes
tyrannizing to others, unless it is balanced or overcome
by this
sympathy for others. And some spiritual philosophers ask
us,
morally, to predominantly nurture sympathy and care
over
self-indulgence, to serve others before oneself, and allow
sympathy
to be the primary guide in one's life actions.
Again,
this is not to say that sympathy or care for others is
necessarily
at odds with one's self-interests and striving for
success, but we
could not claim that these poles are necessarily or
easily in
harmony. Much of what moral sense and moral obligation is
about
are just those circumstances where the conflict is unresolved,
so
moral theory, by definition, should be an attempt to
resolve
conflicts of interest, or conflicts between self-concern
and
sympathy (or other concern). And if a theory doesn't commit
itself
to offering any suggestions here, at least it should show
us how to
know the difference when there is a difference.
Is
the attitude of sympathy necessary or sufficient for good
moral
decision and/or action? Sympathy, being like a natural caring
for
the well-being of another or others, may be sufficient for
a
sympathetic or caring response, but there is no necessary
guarantee
that such an attitude and response would result in good
moral
decision and action. Though, is this attitude necessary for
that
result? That is, could the moral result be realized
without
sympathy or caring? It would seem that at least some
sympathy and
caring is presupposed in moral decisions, if those
decisions
logically and empirically require some attention
transferred from
purely hedonistic concerns to considering others
as well. Maybe some
other attitude could serve this displacement
of self-engrossment, in
which case sympathy would not be necessary
but sufficient for the
displacement. Or maybe impartiality of
ethical reasoning is
sufficient for good moral decision and
action, in which case
sympathy would not be necessary but could
still be sufficient in the
above sense.
Still, neither sympathy
nor impartiality seem to be sufficient
for good moral decision and
action, since these also require
knowledge of what is good or
best, a knowledge which is practical
and concerned with efficient
and successful means to fulfill what is
best (good) for the person
in question. Yet, one could argue that
sympathy is indirectly
sufficient, if sympathy is the primary source
for that practical
knowledge, in that I know what is best for
another through my
sympathy or empathic response, or that the
knowledge of another's
good [interest] derives from an empathetic
reflection of my own
needs and interests.
One could also claim that sympathy is
necessary and sufficient
for actualizing a necessary stage of
moral decision, which is a
stage of intention; while some
practical knowledge must be added for
the criteria successfully
completing a moral action. I can
sympathize with another's pain,
and thus desire to heal the pain,
but I may need special knowledge
to successfully heal that pain. If
I act to help [instinctively]
out of the attitude of sympathy or
caring, but lack the
appropriate knowledge and thus injure the
person even more, we
might ask if this helping was moral. One could
call it an
unintentional mistake, if the intent was moral and the
attitude
was moral, but the act itself may not be moral since the
agent
should have realized the risk of acting without sufficient
practical
knowledge.
A relatively sufficient degree of practical knowledge
might be
demanded of the agent before she should act, without
which we could
claim moral irresponsibility. Still, as Kant held,
morality and
moral character can only logically be a judgement of
intent and not
of action, for we can only hold a person
accountable for their moral
attempts and not base judgement on
consequences or success. Yet, we
might question the morality of
someone who consistently blunders the
interests of others, even
though their feelings and intentions are
of a helpful and caring
nature. In cases like this I would assume
that their knowledge is
insufficient, and the moral prescription for
them would be to
attain the necessary knowledge before jumping in to
help. As
neo-platonistic Christians and Muslims would say, "the
road
to hell is paved with good intentions."
What many
have suggested is that since something like
disinterest/impartiality
and/or sympathy/caring are at the heart of
moral sense and moral
action as necessary conditions, at least at a
necessary stage,
then it follows that we should nurture these
attitudes in order to
develop and actualize the moral
sense/intuition. This imperative,
then, becomes the primary moral
obligation, and stated directly
would say, "Be impartial and
sympathetic!", that is, if
you desire to be moral, because those
attitudes positively lead to
good moral decision and action, though
not guaranteeing complete
success, and those attitudes help develop
moral sensibility. Of
course, if you don't want to be moral then
you won't want to be
sympathetic as well. We find, I think, that the
condition of
sympathy must be a-priori necessary, a synthetic
a-priori
condition for moral sense, moral attention, and even moral
debate.
If moral sense can be reduced to sympathy, that is, if the
posited
moral sense is essentially a sympathetic sense, and nothing
more,
then it stands as an analytical condition. But if sympathy is
a
pre-condition or stage of an actualized moral sense, then it
stands
as a synthetic `a priori' condition for realization.
As far as
developing this quality, or intent or feeling or
attitude, one
doesn't "develop" sympathy by any other means than
just
being it. Basically, it is developed just by exercising the
feeling
or attitude. So the imperative is, "Be Sympathetic!"
Just
as caring is developed by practice, the imperative being
"Be
Caring!"
We should distinguish a sympathy that is
essentially instinctive
or spontaneous, from a volitional
sympathy. The volitional
sympathy, like the development of this
quality, would need some
[sufficient] reason or justification for
that volition. But if it
is instinctive, then it just happens.
Hume believed that humans had
an instinctive sympathetic sense
because of being social animals,
but this is a Cause of the
sensibility and not a reason for
exercising it. Likewise, the
sympathetic attitude may be
instrumentally necessary for the
sustained welfare of human groups,
but this does not make that
social goal a `reason' for being
sympathetic, unless one acts in
response to that reason, or
is motivated by it.
There could be
many good reasons for intentionally developing or
practicing
sympathy. A set of reasons may each be sufficient,
though none
necessary. One possible reason, or motivation for
practice, could
be the realization that life is interconnected and
that all life
counts in the diversity, which gives each life in the
whole a
contributory value. Another possible motivation for
sympathy could
be in its functional usefulness for a society or
group. The
society, or dominating group, conditions or behaviorally
educates
dispositional emotions, such as sympathy, for the success
of the
group-community. Another possible motivation would be in
its
instrumental usefulness for self-fulfillment, when we assume
that
socialness and friendship are necessary to
self-fulfillment,
and that
sympathy is necessary to good,
fulfilling relations and friendships.
Another reason, based on its
own kind of realization, is that
others deserve to be treated as
well as myself. I could recognize
others as beings like myself, so
that all others Should be treated
with the same sympathy and care
I give myself and would like others
to give me. Since I am
intrinsically important, an end-in-myself,
and my feelings and
needs have a value which doesn't need
justification or shown to be
useful to a greater society of people,
and since I am not just a
useful tool of society or for any one
person, and since I claim
this for myself I must, by reason of
non-contradiction, claim the
same for all people, which also
universalizes my belief, my
valuation, my truth, a truth true for
all. Others are
ends-in-themselves, like me, so I give the same
[sympathetic]
caring attention to others as I would to myself. Each
is a
reflection of the essential human being; reason holds every
being
of the same essences with the same [impartial] thought.
Impartiality
and consideration for others could be reduced to
the same. To be
impartial in moral reasoning means that everyone,
including
oneself, is subject to the same rule. This could be the
same as
considering others with the same respect as oneself. What
is
consideration in the moral context? It is considering the needs
and
interests of others, and acting with respect toward these.
Implied
in the understanding of `considering others' is this
consideration
of their interests as one would consider one's own
interests. But
of course it doesn't mean the interests are the same;
only the
intensity of consideration is close to the same. The
feeling of
interconnectiveness, similarity or empathy with that
other being
would positively lead to a consideration of the other as
a mirror
of oneself, which is essentially an impartial or
egalitarian
attitude. Of course, there may be different degrees of
impartiality
and consideration-of-other,, whereby impartiality
stands as the
ideal-to-approach, and consideration-of-other may
range from a
causal attention to intense inspection and commitment
to their
interests.
Recent feminist philosophers and the
philosophers of care have
argued against Kantian impartiality,
either because it seems cold
and indifferent or because such an
attitude is unrealistic for human
beings. I'm sure one could make
some convincing social
instrumentalist arguments for the value of
partial and provincial
prejudice of care, that is, reasons why
non-impartiality is good
(for social or individual well-being). I
won't speculate on these
arguments. But opposite arguments, from
traditional ethics, might
be just as convincing. I don't think
impartiality is necessarily
cold or uncaring. This is a
mis-interpretation of impartiality.
Caring is presupposed in the
impartial ethic; the ethic is
essentially impartial caring or
concern, vs. an attitude of not
caring (or less caring) about
those who are not so intimately
related or those who we don't
expect to reciprocate our care. But
if such [provincial] caring
concern is dependent on what the other
is expected to do for us,
then this seems to ground morality on
hedonistic concerns or
"what's in it for me."
Lastly, the argument that
impartial concern is unrealistic for
humans only has force if such
an attitude is empirically impossible,
for if it is possible then
one could morally prescribe it. There is
no empirical reason to
believe that impartiality is impossible. One
could make a
convincing argument that "perfect" impartiality
is
impossible; but then one could counter this with the
prescription to
practice impartiality as best one can, that is, to
intentionally
approach this ideal attitude or condition of moral
reasoning.
Impartiality might seem "unrealistic" just
because most humans don't
give it enough intentional effort. Also,
basing an argument on the
moral ineptitude and moral apathy of the
average social animal is
not a forceful argument, as one cannot
defeat moral prescriptions by
proving how corrupt are the Romans.
So again, the only good argument
would be in showing how
provincial caring is better (for who?!) than
impartial caring. And
what is meant by better? Maybe we naturally
feel better and more
loved when receiving biased care, instead of
merely being equal
like everyone else in the eyes of our care-giver.
Or, maybe one
could prove that impartiality breeds a lack of the
necessary
intensity in caring for other's welfare.
The new care ethic
proposed is primarily an ethic of good moral
intent or a
sympathetic-caring attitude. Whatever the exact
relation of this
care attitude (or feeling, or intent) to the
sympathetic attitude
or something else like it, the new literature
maintains most often
that caring attention tends to focus on
particulars, particular
people in particular places and times.
Though, caring attention
could also be focussed on masses and
groups. Mothering is a good
example of individually focussed caring
attention. If there is
conflict between caring for masses and caring
for my close family
and friends, there is no doubt that our natural
tendency is to
value close ones over strangers. This may be out of
convenience,
or habit, or it may be due to sympathy being stronger
in closer
proximity to the other, or it may be due to an instinctual
reasoning
that those close to me have more value to my
self-fulfillment.
Yet, a description of what people tend to do
cannot justify an
obligation to be that way or an ethic committed to
parochial focus
of caring. Such a partial moral attitude or
reasoning may be the
better moral ethic, but it cannot be justified
by the tendency of
mothers and family clans to act in this manner,
however wonderful
we all respect the mother.
The best justification for such
non-impartial caring or ethical
obligation is that I need for my
well-being a caring social group,
or at least some one(s) to care
about me, and so this [local]
care-group has ethical priority,
from my relative perspective of
need, over other people or groups
who are not directly in my
reciprocating care-group. So, this
justification is also a reason
for being sympathetic and giving
caring attention to others, even if
not all others. Thus, we can
look for the causes or motivations for
`sympathy'. Does the
attitude of sympathy have some reason behind
it, and if so could
the right reasons motivate one to be
sympathetic? Does sympathy
require some reasons and justifications
for one to voluntarily
take this stance? Or is sympathy just
instinctually spontaneous in
healthy people?
Hume thought that reason could not by
itself prove what are good
moral decisions, and neither could it
motivate us to moral action.
So, the only foundation of good moral
judgement, and the only power
that could motivate us to moral
acts, would have to be a
moral passion. When Hume said that reason
is the slave of the
passions he wasn't attempting a normative
statement that reason
should be the slave of the passions, though
prescription may be
subtly inherent in his descriptive psychology.
He meant that,
empirically, humans are motivated by passion and
not reason, that
reason cannot by itself motivate action. Passion
is the motivator,
while reason can be used to calculate how to
fulfill passions and/or
to justify them in some partial way.
Yet,
reason could also be a `passion', as the passion to
comprehend
moral good through some kind of moral reasoning, and this
reasoning
could be powerful in motivating or overpowering
emotional
inclinations. Kant believed that reason could motivate
action,
though this presumes that one first has a passion to
consider moral
reasons and act according to reason. Kant might
even say there are
good reasons for acting according to reason, so
once we realize
these reasons we will be passionately motivated to
act by reason.
Kant's argument is that reason Can not only
determine and motivate
action, but that it Ought to. But, it
seems, the only way it
could motivate us is if we do accept that
reason Ought to motivate
us, so reason can tell us what we ought
to do if we somehow accept
that we ought to act by reason, and the
way we would accept this
imperative is if either we are governed
by a natural passion to
consider and act by reason or if we find
some greater reason for
considering and acting by reason.
If
we are motivated by a sense of `ought', then this `ought'
could
either be an `ought to be motivated by moral reasoning' or
`ought
to be motivated by a moral feeling or sensitivity.' But Hume
believed
that reason cannot make a moral man. Even if it could
supposedly
derive the `right' moral decision, it could not cause us
to do
this, unless one already possessed a moral passion, giving one
the
desire or commitment to act in a sensitive way toward others. I
think
that some kind of `moral' passion has to be presupposed in
moral
decisions and acts; yet, any kind of `moral' reasoning would
also
presuppose such a moral passion, in order that such an effort
of
consideration take place.
Reason is not the servant of the
passions, for Kant, because
reason has to dictate order and
constraint to the passions. Though,
the passion-to-reason would be
apriori to reason. Reason is for
Kant, as it was for Plato and
Aristotle, the necessary ruler and
organizer of the passions. The
function of reason is to comprehend
truth and calculate right
action and guide life decisions. Man is a
rational creature
because he is able to, and ought to, be guided by
reasoning what
is right and good, and not merely act by passions and
instinctual
drives. Reasons must control the passions because the
passions
have no control over themselves. Passions are automatic
and
habitual. But only reason can question the passions, and
question
what is true and good. Reason can control the passions.
It is
capable of this. And if reason can also determine what is
good,
what is good decision, then our human destiny, or fulfillment,
is
for reason to direct the passions, or to direct our lives,
according
to the truth discovered, the truth of what is
intrinsically good
and what is efficiently good for fulfilling
intrinsic
ends.
KANT'S REASONING
Kant believed that reason, must
be universal and categorical,
according to the nature and
definition of reason. Of course, reason
could still be
contexual-specific or hypothetical to the
circumstance, but it
must be universal in the sense that if
circumstances are identical
then reason should not derive different
conclusions. Logic tells
us that if circumstance X is sufficiently
like circumstance Y,
then any moral solution to X must be the same
for Y. Yet, this
reasoning cannot guarantee that such circumstances
can be
sufficiently similar, or that one could distinguish
which
circumstances are sufficiently similar from those not. What
is the
criteria for similarity? Or how is similarity recognized?
In other
words, a counter argument to this kantian reasoning could
be an
impossibility of applying such reasoning due to the
epistemological
impossibility of realizing what is sufficiently
similar.
Reason is impartial to personal opinions, but not
impartial to
complex, different circumstances and contexts, the
facts of life
about which we reason. In other words, reason is
concerned with
particulars as well as generalities, because it has
to deal with
real [particular] facts, in all there uniqueness, in
order to know
how to apply general principles or rules, and also
how to correctly
generalize (or categorize) these particulars.
Generalizations are
needed to converse about and compare
particulars, and particulars
are needed in the practical
application of generalities (which are
rules), as well as in the
induction of generalities (or rules).
Kant believed that moral
propositions had to be imperative
assertions applying to everyone,
that is, if I say such or such is
good and another action is bad,
I'm not stating what I think is just
"good for me but not
necessarily for you" [in similar
circumstances], nor am I
stating what my `personal morals' are, nor
`what makes me feel
good'. I'm claiming something, or an action, as
good for everyone
[to do], that is if our circumstances are
sufficiently identical
enough to warrant the generalization that
"what is good in my
circumstance is also good in yours." But one
does not include
as `circumstance' the peculiar perversities of the
subject's
behavior, nor the [past] circumstances thought to have
caused or
contributed to that unique behavior, because this would
make moral
claims relative to subjective conditions, while moral
claims
should only be relative to objective conditions.
Yet, any
universal claim concerning people interacting with
others would
logically depend on some essential subjective
condition, which is
that `people' are sufficiently similar. If I
say that all people
ought to behave under a certain general
principle, then I'm using
a generalization of `people', and only
those who possess the
essential conditions of my concept of `person'
would be bound by
this moral rule. Therefore, people with severe
mental or physical
handicaps, that is, people without sufficient
abilities to act
according to my rule, would be exempt from it,
because their
condition would not be sufficiently similar to my
generalization
of `people'.
So, Kant had to presuppose a general subjective
condition of
people, that those bound by his moral principles have
similar
dispositions or capabilities for understanding and
applying the
principles. His universal ethical propositions
necessarily
presuppose a universal condition of people. All people
must be
perceived as having the capacity to reason correctly and
behave
correctly, which is Kant's empirical (or
metaphysical)
presupposition that all people have the same
universal capacities to
reason what is morally good. Also implied
in Kant's ethic is the
presupposition that the principles of his
reasoning or logic is
right and good.
A morality following
reason has an inherent moral prescription
to follow the logic of
this reason. Such a morality is based on an
intellectual ability.
The moral ability is essentially an ability
to reason. Of course,
this moral ability may require more than just
good reasoning. This
depends how one defines that moral ability. If
it i